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RAHNER AND HEIDEGGER: BEING, HEARING, 
AND GOD 
TI IMMEDIATE GOAL of this essay is to delimit the essential difference between Rahner's philosophy of religion and Heidegger's philosophy of Being. Why 
is it necessary to establish the ground of disagreement between 
these thinkers? For one thing, it has been claimed by some 
that Heidegger's philosophy has had a profound effect on 
Rahner's thought. Louis Roberts, for example, has maintained 
"that Heidegger's influence on Rahner is nearly as great as 
Marechal's." 1 Rahner himself suggests that "perhaps" Dr. 
Roberts overestimates this . . . influence somewhat." 2 In 
any case, it will be maintained here that any valid interpre-
tation of the influence of Heidegger on Rahner must take into 
account the fundamental difference between them. It will be 
maintained that this difference is at the level of the most 
basic questions which each poses and therefore has ramifica-
tions which go beyond mere methodological differences. This 
is not intended to be a refutation to the claim that Heidegger 
has influenced Rahner, for he certainly has. It is merely hoped 
that the delimitation of the fundamental difference between 
their thought will make it possible to assess most accurately 
how the one has influenced the other. This essay, however, 
will not attempt such an assessment, nor will it attempt a 
point by point comparison of Rahner's philosophy with Hei-
degger's. 
A second reason for delimiting the difference between their 
philosophies has to do with the relation of Heidegger's thought 
to Thomistic philosophy, and more generally to metaphysics. 
It is hoped that the investigation will clarify quite emphatically 
1 Louis Roberts, The A chievement of Karl Rahner (New York, 1967), p. 17. 
2 Karl Rahner, "Forward" to The Achievement of Karl Rahner, p. viii. 
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the fundamental differences which underlie any apparent simi-
larities between Heidegger's perspective on the question of 
being and the metaphysician's perspective. 
The alleged influence of Heidegger on Rahner is evident, in 
part, in the notion of "hearing" or "attending" (haren) 
which plays a central role in the tnought of both. In Hearers 
of the Word Rahner definies man as essentially a potential 
hearer of a word from God. The philosophy of religion must 
prepare for this hearing by demonstrating metaphysically 
that man has this potentiality. Consequently, Rahner defines 
theology (theology in the" positive" and fundamental sense 
as the reception of Revelation and not in the sense of its 
elaboration) as a "hearing." Theology is fundamentally the 
" hearing" either of an historical word from God or of his 
silence.3 Similarly, Heidegger's philosophy of Being could be 
defined as a type of thinking which is essentially a " hearing," 
or better an " attending," but as ,viII be shown, a very different 
kind of hearing than is developed in Rahner's thought. 
More fundamental for both thinkers than the notion or 
hearing, however, is the notion of "being." Rahner argues 
metaphysically to the notion of man as "hearer of the word " 
from man's V orgri fJ (pre-comprehension) of being. Similarly, 
Heidegger's notion of man as a hearer is developed in his 
attempt to think the meaning of Sein (Being).4 The difference 
between the notion of hearing in these two philosophies is 
ultimately grounded in the difference in the question of being 
posed by each. Fundamentally, therefore, this essay is con-
cerned with the issue of being as it is developed in Rahner's 
transcendental Thomism and Heidegger's philosophy of Being. 
It is necessary to make explicit several further restrictions 
of our topic. Since the essay is concerned with the point of 
difference between Rahner and Heidegger, and since the volume 
3 Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word, trans. Michael Richards (New YOl'k~ 1968), 
pp. 10-11. Hereafter: HW. 
'For reasons which will become apparent Heidegger's Sein is translated here 
as Being (capital B). Rahner's Sein which for him is equivalent to esse is 
translated as being (small b). 
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and complexity of Heidegger's reflection on Being are so ex-
tensive, no attempt will be made here to give a balanced or 
comprehensive presentation of Heidegger's thought in itself. 
The primary focus of attention will be determined by the 
presentation of Rahner's thesis. Nor will it be possible to 
consider -comprehensively the system of transcendental 
Thomism, as it has come to be called, except insofar as it is 
involved in the definition of man as a potential hearer of God's 
word. Finally, although it is hoped that this essay will help 
to indicate how one would proceed to investigate the relation 
of Heidegger's philosophy to theology, such an investigation-
very involved in itself-will not be pursued. 
Since Rahner llas published a reflection on Heidegger's 
thought-although not an extensive one, and based only on 
the early works-it seems quite natural to consider it first.5 
Hopefully the consideration of that article will enable us to 
take an initial stance with regard to Rahner's evaluation of 
Heidegger, and will also serve as a general introduction to 
Heidegger's thought. An examination of Rahner's philosophy 
of religion as developed in Hearers of the Word will follow, 
with attention focused on those elements which subsequently 
will be shown as the fundamental bone of contention between 
Heidegger and Rahner. Having done this it will be necessary 
to re-evaluate Rahner's critique of Heidegger's thought in the 
light of what will be maintained is a more faithful rea.ding of 
Heidegger's question about Being. It will then be sho"vn what 
sense" hearing" comes to have in regard to such a question. 
It will not be possible to limit the consideration of Heidegger 
to one or two sta.tements of his position and so indications will 
have to be gleaned from a number of his ,vorks. The essay 
concludes, contrary to the general consensus, that the phi-
losophies of Rahner and Heidegger differ at the very level of 
the question asked. 
* * * 
li Karl Rahner, "The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Hcidegger," trans. 
Andrew Tallon, Philosophy Today, 13 (1969), pp. 1~6-87. Originally published 
in French in 1940. Hereafter: CEo 
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Rahner's essay on Heidegger is brief and attempts merely 
to introduce its readers to the broad outlines of his philosophy. 
It does not attempt either a comprehensive evaluation of his 
thought or a comparison of it to other systems of thought. 
Since Rahner does restrict the s~ope of his article, it would 
be unfair to evaluate it as an extensive and nuanced interpre-
tation, much less as necessarily representing Rahner's current 
evaluation of Heideggerian philosophy. Nevertheless, the 
essay does situate Heidegger's question within a specific con-
text, and it does project and evaluate the possible development 
of Heidegger's thought from that context. Although Rahner's 
conjectures are only provisory, they nevertheless firmly esta-
blish the ground on which Rahner's thought confronts Heideg-
ger's. It will be shown in the discussion of Hearers of the Word 
how Rahner moves from this ground himself. In our own 
re-evaluation of, this essay, however, it will be shown that 
the ground upon which Rahner bases his interpretation of 
Heidegger is indeed very shaky ground. Although few of 
Heidegger's later works were available in 1940, Rahner's inter-
pretation misunderstands the most essential points made even 
in the works which he did consider, sc. SZ, KM, WM, and WG.6 
This is, of course, not meant as a criticism of Rahner but as a 
preparation for the delimitation of the difference between his 
philosophy and Heidegger's. 
Rahner considers Heidegger a metaphysician. As a meta-
6 The following abbreviations will be used to refer to the translations of 
Heidegger's works: 
EM-An Introduction to Metaphysics trans. Ralph Manheim (New York, 1961). 
KM-Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics trans. James S. Churchhill (Blooming-
ton, Indiana, 1968). 
SZ-Being and Time, trans. John ~Iacquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, 
1966). The pagination of the German edition is given in this translation and 
used also in this paper. 
WG-Tke Essence of Reason, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, 1969). 
WM-" What is Metaphysics? " trans. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, in Existence and 
Being, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago, 1970), pp. 825-61. 
Intro to WM_H The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," trans. and ed. 
Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York, 
1969), pp. 206-21. 
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physician Heidegger, according to Rahner, asks about being as 
such, in its totality, as that which is most general. Rahner 
understands this concern with being as that which is most 
general, as a concern about the act of being, the esse character-
istic of all beings (ens). Likewise, he understands Heidegger's 
concern with being in its totality as a concern with esse as the 
unifying aspect under which all possible objects are able to be 
comprehended and summed up, and as the ultimate cause to 
which they can be related. Metaphysics insofar as it asks this 
question about being is called "ontology," and insofar as it 
looks for the universal basis of all being it is "theology." All 
philosophy since Plato and Aristotle is at its base, therefore, 
"onto-theological." According to Rahner, Heidegger accepts 
this heritage-this concern about being as such-and makes it 
his own. (CE, 128) 
What is distinctive, according to Rahner's interpretation, 
about Heidegger's approach to metaphysics is that he seeks 
to put it on a new foundation. The whole tradition of phi-
losophy from Plato to Hegel has conceived being in terms of 
logos and thus as correlative to thought or reason. l\Ian was 
defined as the animal rationalis and the question of being was 
"interpreted from the logical grasp of being by thought." 
(CE, 130) Rahner maintains that Heidegger's originality lies 
in the fact that he asks the "question about being without 
conceiving it beforehand as onto-logy." (CE, 130) Thus 
Heidegger situates the question about being on a new plane 
which does not presuppose the definition of man or being in 
terms of logos, but which sees man as the place where being is 
" comprehended" in a more fundamental way. According to 
Rahner, this is why Heidegger defines his task as the establish-
ing of a more "fundamental ontology." It is also for this 
reason that Heidegger wants to go back beyond the traditional 
starting point of metaphysics to the point of its origin with 
the Pre-Socratics when being was not conceived beforehand 
in terms of logic. (CE, 130) 
Rahner maintains that this more fundamental investigation 
of the being question assumes the form of a transcendental 
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analysis. For this reason Rahner situates Heidegger within the 
tradition of modem philosophy which according to Rahner is 
essentially transcendental philosophy .... 4.s Rahner sees it, "a 
question is posed on the transcendental plane when it asks for 
the a priori conditions that m!tke knowledge of an object 
possible," that is to say, when the investigator himself becomes 
the object of investigation. (CE, 129) Since being as such is 
not accessible as this or that being, and since it cannot be 
obtained in its pure state, the only access which one has to 
being is through man who must already possess some knowl-
edge of being to raise the question in the first place. In other 
words, Rahner tells us, in order to ask about the a priori 
conditions which render possible the knowledge of being, the 
investigator must become the object of investigation. (CE, 
129) 
Rahner notes that it is important to keep in mind that 
Heidegger's sole concern is always with the question about 
being. The transcendental analytic of man, therefore, aims at 
resolving the question about being. It is not in any sense 
aimed at establishing an anthropology. The question of man 
is always subordinate to the question about being. (CE, 129) 
Accordingly, Rahner maintains that we are able to define 
Heidegger's philosophy as: 
the transcendental investigation of what man is insofar as he raises 
the question of being, an investigation that rejects the initial 
traditional stance in this matter-exclusively intellectual-and 
undertaken with the intention of providing an answer to the 
question of being in general. (CE, lSI; printed entirely in italics) 
Rahner tells us that Heidegger's transcendental investi-
gation of man is an analysis of man as "Dasein." What 
does Heidegger mean by this term? ... 4ccording to Rahner, 
"Dasein" does not designate simply being-present-there (etre-
la-present) in the sense in which one could affinn anything 
whatever, but rather "Dasein" is being-human itself----each 
of us. It is characterized inherently by the transcendence 
which orients man towards being, and from which derives the 
ability to understand oneself in a definite way, to take an 
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attitude towards oneself. As a conquence "existence" in 
Heidegger's special terminology denotes not the fact that a 
being is, but rather it denotes ". . . man, insofar as he is in 
some way the object of this free self-disposition." (CE, 131) 
The existential analytic of Dasein, therefore, consists in the 
determination of the general and formal structures which are 
proper to Dasein as a mode of being-human, in other words as 
"existence," as a state of "openness" (transcendence) to 
being. These structures are called" existentials." SZ is almost 
entirely devoted to an explication of these structures. The 
analysis displays itself, Rahner maintains, in two stages. The 
first consists in a phenomenological description of Dasein as 
"being-in-the-world." The second reduces this being-in-the-
world to its ultimate sense as "being-in-time." (CE, 131-32) 
Rahner explains that being-in-the-world describes Dasein's 
" existence" as Heidegger conceives it. Man is, only insofar as 
he is in the world. This being-in-the-world is not a secondary 
process by which Dasein as a closed subject in some way 
comes into contact v.rith an exterior world. Rather, from the 
very start Dasein is already outside of itself in the world and 
in the things of the world. Being in the world according to 
Rahner, therefore, consists in the a priori possibility of Dasein 
to be related to the things of the world and the world itself. 
Man is from the very start open to the totality of the world, 
and the totality of the \vorld is, albeit under an empty form, 
given him right from the outset. (CE, 132) 
Rahner explains that this being-in-the-world has a triple 
aspect which is described by Heidegger as Verstehen, Geworfen-
heit, and Verfallenneit. The first term refers to Heidegger's 
contention that Dasein is not present to itself by a static 
knowledge of properties but rather is present to itself by a 
stretching-ahead-of-self-toward-the-future. This " tension-a-
head-of-self-toward-the-future" is " understanding, man's way 
of comprehending and grasping himself, of grasping and re-
structuring his own power-to-be." (CE, 133) Through this 
Verstehen Dasein finds itself always brought into question and 
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is thus present to itself. Rahner notes that according to 
Heidegger this stretching of Dasein towards its "subjective 
possibilities" must always begin from Dasein's past-a past 
which has been imposed upon Dasein and of which it has no 
hold. This " state-of-being-thr0wn into this or that condition" 
(etat-de-jete-dans-teUes et telles conditions) Heidegger calls 
" thrownness" (Geworfenheit). Furthermore, the tension-a-
head-of-self-toward-the-future from the past-into-which-it-has-
been-thrown necessarily involves Dasein with the things of 
the world to such an extent that Dasein becomes prey to them 
and enslaved. This enslavement Heidegger calls" Verfallen-
heit." Being-in-the-world as Verstehn, Geworfenheit, and Ver-
fallenheit is summed up by the term "Care" (in German 
"Sorge," in French" Sollicitude"). (CE, 132-33) 
The second stage of the analysis of SZ-the reduction of 
Dasein to its ultimate sense-becomes evident, Rahner ob-
serves, when, on the one hand, it is noted that the proper and 
strict possibility towards which Dasein carries itself is the 
certain possibility of its own impossibility, of its death, and 
when, on the other hand, it is noted that to the three aspects 
of Care correspond the elements of human duration (la 
" duree " humaine): future, present, and past. Duration, here, 
does not refer to the "time" we calculate, but rather to the 
foundation of such time in the temporal structure of Dasein 
as: the stretching-ahead-of -self-towards-its-ownmost-possibili-
ty or future (sc. death) , from its depenedence on a past into 
which it has been thrown, realized in the present as a response 
to the attraction of the future, and the compulsion and con-
straint of the past. Rahner concludes, then, that for Heidegger 
Dasein as Care and as a being essentially towards death, is 
by its very structure temporal. Dasein is intrinsically finite. 
(CE, 133-34) 
Having outlined the general structure of Heidegger's exist-
ential analytic of Desein, Rahner returns to the original 
question-what is being as such?-and discovers that SZ never 
directly addresses itself to this question, leaving its answer to 
a proposed second volume. But although Rahner is unable to 
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extract the kernel of Heideggerian metaphysics from SZ, he 
does attempt to draw from it and from indications in WM 
and WG some" conjectures" about Heidegger's answer to the 
being question. 
Dasein, Rahner observes, is a being-towards-death-a pro-
jection out of past and present towards Dasein's future. This 
projection is not a property of Dasein, but rather is the very 
act of being-human. The original mode of the projection or 
anticipatory grasp is not a theoretical knowledge in terms of 
logic, but rather it is an experience or state-of-disposition 
(Tallon translates "etat d' ame" as "state of soul") which 
Heidegger defines as " anxiety." This dispositional state reveals 
" nothingness" (neant) as the ultimate ,. virtuality" of Dasein, 
and as that in which Dasein is already engaged. Dasein's 
transcendence, his passing beyond beings, is a passing to no-
thingness. Rahner maintains, therefore, that Heidegger appears 
to identify pure being and pure nothingness. Consequently, 
all beings as participants in nothingness are necessarily finite. 
Rahner observes that this view does not seem to allow even the 
possibility of raising a question about the existence of God. 
As far as Rahner can tell, Heidegger's ontology offers no 
support for a pure Being positively superior as such to all 
finitude. (CE, 134-35) 
Although it seems like Heidegger's thought allows no room 
for the idea of God, Rahner notes that Heidegger, himself., 
denies that his analysis says anything either for or against the 
possibility of God. Thus Rahner maintains it is impossible until 
the completion of his ontology to tell for sure if it will give 
to metaphysics "a meaning that is either the most radically 
atheist or the most profoundly religious." (CE, 137) All we 
can do, Rahner insists, is note that up till now the existential 
analytic of Dasein logically seems to be not an ontology but 
an Ontochronic (an expression Rahner attributes to Heidegger 
himself) -" a science which showing that the meaning of all 
being as such, and, absolutely, the meaning of Being, is nothing-
ness." (CE, 136) 
Rahner does not attempt to analyze Heidegger's thought 
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from the point of view of Christianity, but he does explain a 
little more fully what he means when he suggests that the 
ultimate resolution of Heidegger's philosophy will be either 
most radically atheistic or most profoundly religious. Heideg-
ger's eventual ontology will lay ~he foundation for atheism if, 
as Rahner seems to think it is to be feared, the last word of its 
anthropology is nothingness, for then the last word of the 
ontology still to come must also be nothingness. On the other 
hand, Rahner claims that Heidegger's philosophy could lay the 
groundwork for a profoundly religious view if the analysis of 
Dasein in its ultimate stage discovers the infinity of the 
absolute as the first a priori of human transcendence, and if it 
discovers the true destiny of man in the choice between eternal 
nothingness and eternal life before God. In this case Heideg-
ger's analysis of man as an historical being, as an essentially 
"finite creature," and as a temporal being renders possible an 
attentiveness to Revelation. 
In this case, to jar man loose fronl the pure idea and cast him into 
his own existence and history, as Heidegger is doing, would be to 
prepare him, to make him attentive to the fact-existential, his-
torical-of a divine revelation, would be to open him to "the God 
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," to the" Word of Life, seen, heard, 
touched" by human hands, "Jesus of Nazareth. . .. " (CE, 137) 
This description is striking because it serves as a nearly perfect 
introduction to and crystalization of the philosophy of religion 
developed in Hearers of the Word.7 
Rahner's aim in Hearers of the Word is to lay the foundation 
for a philosophy of religion faithful to the principles of the 
Thomistic tradition yet unique in that it raises a question 
never explicitly posed by St. Thomas. (cf. HW, 33) He 
suggests that the nature of this philosophy of religion could be 
most clearly defined by comparing it with theology. It is 
necessary, therefore, to ask the question about the relationship 
7 This similarity of Rahner's philosophy of religion and his projection of the 
possible developments of Heidegger's philosophy of Being suggest the value of 
following the argument of HW in this preliminary delimitation of the essential 
difference between their philosophies. 
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of these two sciences. The question of the relationship between 
sciences, however, is ultimately a question about their common 
foundation, and that science which serves as foundation for all 
other sciences and grants them their a priori attitudes and 
principles-whether or not these principles are self-conscious-
is called-metaphysics. The question of the relationship between 
the philosophy of religion and theology is consequently a meta-
physical question. Science of any kind, however, is a human 
activity. Thus, the question of the relationship between the 
philosophy of religion and theology is ultimately a metaphysical 
question about the nature of man. It is what, in the previous 
article, Rahner called a transcendental question. (HW, 3-7) 
If the question presented so far is probed deeper, Rahner 
maintains that a series difficulty will be discovered. "For 
classical Christian philosophy of religion . . . knowledge of 
God ... is no static, self-contained science, but a profound 
element of ontology in general." (HW, 7) But if this is true, 
then the philosophy of religion as ontology (or the metaphysics 
of being) is the same as the science in which it finds its ground. 
The question of the philosophy of religion is thus a question 
about the "self-establishment of metaphysics." Ultimately, 
therefore, "the question about the philosophy of religion be-
comes the question as to why man pursues metaphysics and 
being, and how human metaphysics can reach up to God." 
(HW, 8) 
If this philosophy of religion is to be truly a " philosophy" 
and not a "theology" there can be no question of its justifying 
or explicating a revelation from God. On the other hand, if 
theology is to be truly "theology" and not "philosophy," 
then the philosophy of religion cannot a priori reduce revelation 
to merely what is discovered by reason. To establish itself the 
philosophy of religion must ask if there is any "reason" to 
suppose that man is a potential hearer of a divine revelation. 
The asking of such a question is a purely philosophical venture, 
but as such it lays the foundation for theology-the actual 
hearing of the revealed word-by pointing out to man whether 
or not he should seek such a revealed word in history. Rahner 
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proposes that, in fact, it can be shown that man by his very 
nature is a potential hearer of a possible revelation from God 
in history. (HW, 7-27) 
Rahner describes the method which he chooses to achieve 
this end in terms very similar to t,hose with which he described 
Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein. Rahner proposes: 
to sketch the outlines of a metaphysical analytic of man with 
reference to the capacity to hear the word of God which is addressed 
to man as the revelation of the unknown God allowing the history 
of man to appear. To put a question metaphysically, however, is 
to put a question about being. (HW, 32) 
Rahner's pursuit of this question about the being of man 
establishes the three propositions of metaphysical anthropology 
that constitute the essence of his philosophy of religion: 1) 
that "man is a spirit (a characterization which stamps his 
whole being as man) and thus has an ear that is open to any 
word whatsoever that may proceed from the mouth of the 
Eternal" (HW, 67) ; 2) "that man is that existent thing who 
stands in free love before the God of a possible revelation ... 
(and who) is attentive to the speech or silence of God in the 
measure in which he opens himself in free love to this message 
of the speech or silence of the God of revelation" (HW, 108) ; 
and 3) that" man is that existent thing who must listen for an 
historical revelation of God, given in history and possibly in 
human speech." (HW, 161) 
These three propositions and the philosophy of religion 
which they constitute are based on Rahner's notion of being as 
that which is revealed to man through a preconceptual, non-
thematic grasp, but which at the same time is hidden from 
man because of his finitude. It is at this level where the 
essential difference between Rahner and Heidegger emerges, so 
this is where the present essay will find its focus. 
* * * 
Rahner begins his analytic for the being of man in a manner 
that appears to be similar to Heidegger's posing of the ques-
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tion about being. Metaphysics asks about the being of that 
which is. It "enquires into the ultimate reasons, into the 
final cause of reality. . . ." (HW, 33) This questioning is 
unavoidable. "We are compelled to ask: What is the' being' 
of that which is?" (HW, 34) ; and it is precisely as men that 
we are compelled to do so. Rahner develops this notion more 
fully in Spirit in the W orld.8 There he observes that man 
questions, and that this questioning is irreducible because every 
question presupposes a placing in question. Rahner maintains 
that man necessarily questions because being in its totality is 
given to him only as something questionable. For Rahner the 
ontological implication of the fact that man necessarily ques-
tions is the conclusion that man exists as the question about 
being in its totality. Thus, the question about being as posed 
by man is the point of departure for metaphysics. 
Since nothing can be asked about the totally unknown, 
Rahner observes that the fact that man poses the question 
about being attests to an a priori grasp of being in general. 
Thus Rahner believes that he is able to deduce from man's 
existence, as "the question about existence," the familiar 
Thomistic teaching that "human thinking is always accom-
panied by an unexpressed knowledge of being [esse] as the 
condition of all knowledge of the existing individual." (HW, 
36) 
Rahner proceeds further to note that being can obviously 
be questioned only insofar as it is known. From this Rahner 
deduces the Thomistic position that knowability is the most 
fundamental note of being. "A thing which is, and the possible 
object of a cognition, are one and the same, for the being of that 
which is, is knowability." (HW, 38-39) This implies, Rahner 
argues, the Thomistic position that "being is knowing and 
being known in their original unity." (HW, 44) The sense of 
knowing here is not that of reaching from something inside to 
something outside but is rather conceived as a presence-to-seIf. 
8 Cf. Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych (New York, 1968), 
pp. 57-78. Hereafter SW. 
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For Rahner, therefore, "the essence of being is the being-
present-to-itself of being or the luminosity of being to itself as 
" subjectivity." (HW, 37-44) 
Rahner argues, furthermore, that although man can deduce 
the unity of being and knowing from the fact of his existence 
as the question about being, the questionability of being as 
such-that is to say, the fact that man has to raise the question, 
the fact that he is not absolute self-presence-rules out any 
form of pantheism or " debased idealism." Man "has being," 
but is not pure absolute being itself. Man is finite. From this 
fact Rahner argues to the Thomistic notion that being is 
"analogous." By this term Rahner means to suggest that the 
" attribution of being itself is an interiorly variable quantity." 
(HW, 47) In other words, the degree of self-presence or self-
luminosity varies from being to being. A TInite being is, there-
fore, only to the degree that it "has being," only to the degree 
that it has a potentiality for self presence. (HW, 45-52) 
But what is this being as such which Rahner conceives as 
self-luminosity and as analogically attributable to all beings? 
Furthermore, what is man's relation to being? Rahner suggests 
that the answers to these question can be discovered by an 
analysis of the act of judgment. In every judgment a predicate 
is affirmed of a subject. Furthermore, insofar as the judgment 
is true, it is itself affirmed of something that is in itself 
independent of the passing of judgment. By this process man 
establishes the object of his judgment as something different 
from and independent of his judgment, and therefore as differ-
ent from and independent of himself. In this way man con-
stitutes himself as a subject opposed to an object. As subject 
he is able to return to himself by turning out towards (that is 
to say, by objectifying) the objects with which he is initially 
one. It is only through this process that man is able to 
comprehend himself as a subject who subsists-in-himself and 
who is free (i. e., of that which stands against him) . 
Now the question which Rahner poses is this: what is " the 
ultimate cause of the possibility of man, in his subsisting-in-
himself, taking a position distinct from the things he handles 
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in conscious thought-judgment "? (HW, 56) He argues that in 
essence this question is only another side of a more familiar 
problem in Scholastic philosophy. In every judgment a thing is 
affirmed as a "this" or a "that." This is also true of human 
activity considered more generally. Man always deals with 
this particular thing or that. The ability to take hold of this 
or that particular thing presupposes the ability to comprehend 
it under a general concept, that is to say, the ability to elevate 
the perceptions of the senses to the level of the concept. This is 
what in Tholnistic epistemology is caned" abstraction." To ask 
about the condition of possibility of human subsisting-in-self, 
therefore, is to ask about the possibility of abstraction. (HW, 
53-57) 
Rahner describes absraction as the ability to " loosen away 
from" or to detach the" thisness" (in Scholastic terminology 
the form or quiddity) from any example of a particular 
"this." "Abstraction is thus the recognition of the non-
restriction of the 'thisness' that is given in the particular 
sense." (HW,58) Now in order to elevate the sense impression 
of a particular "this" to a recognition of a non -restricted 
"this," the intellect must grasp the particular as "limited." 
But to recognize this" limit," it must already have grasped it 
in reference to a " something more." This" something more" 
is what Rahner means by "being in general." The grasping 
in terms of this more is what he means by the preconcept 
(VorgrifJ) . 
In each particular cognition it [the intellect] al\vays reaches out 
beyond the particular object. and thus grasps it, not just as its 
unrelated, dead "thisness," but in its limitation and reference to 
the totality of all possible objects. . . . The pre-concept is the 
condition for the possibility of the universal concept, of the 
abstraction \vhich in turn is what makes possible the objectification 
of the datum of sense perception and so of conscious subsisting-
in-oneself. (HW, 59) 
Rahner argues that the object of this Vorgriff cannot be an 
object like those which are made known through the Vorgriff 
itself. Thus it would appear that to an extent Rahner's position 
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is similar to Heidegger's who, as was shown, holds that 
"Being" is not like beings. It is in the further elaboration of 
this a priori grasp that Rahner seems to consciously distinguish 
his position from Heidegger's. As was seen previously, Rahner 
believed that Heidegger's Dasein as a transcendence to being 
is essentially a transcendence to nothingness. This alleged 
notion, as it was elaborated in WM, was based on the argument 
that negation can only be grounded in a prior comprehension 
of "nothingness." Here Rahner argues that just the opposite is 
the case-that the notion of negation is derived through man's 
Vorgriff of an absolute" having being" and that the concept 
of non-being is derived from the notion of negation.9 Why? 
Rahner argues that human cognition is related to that 
which is, and not what is-not-at least insofar as all knowledge 
begins in sense perception. He maintains that, if the knowledge 
of the limitation of the objects of knowledge can be explained 
in terms of a VorgrifJ of being as positive, there is no need to 
posit a transcendence to nothingness. But, Rahner continues, 
it has already been shown that beings are to the extent that 
they" have being." They are grasped not in terms of nothing 
but in terms of a VorgrifJ of the perfection of pure "having 
being." Rahner maintains that this can be deduced from the 
fact of the question of being, from the judgment, and from the 
freedom of human activity. "To the extent that judgment 
and free action are necessarily part of man's existence, the 
pre-concept of being pure and simple in its own intrinsically 
proper infinitude is part of the fundamental constitution of 
human existence." (HW, 63) Since Rahner has already ruled 
out the possibility of pantheism, that being which has being 
absolutely must be God himself. Thus Rahner claims that: 
God is posited, too, with the same necessity as this pre-concept. 
He is the thing of which is affirmed absolute "having existence." 
'I do not mean to suggest that the arguments we considered in Hearers of the 
Word were intended as a direct answer to Heidegger's analysis. Bahner appears 
to be speaking much more generally. But it also seems that Heidegger's position, 
as Rahner understands it, is among those which he believes his arguments refute. 
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It is true that the pre-concept does not present any object at all 
along with itself. But in this pre-concept (as the necessary and 
ever already actualized condition for 'every human cognition and 
every human action) the existence of an existent thing of absolute 
" having being" ( tha t is, of God) has already been affirmed if not 
presented. In the pre-concept the cause of his specific possibility is 
unknowningly affirmed. (HW, 63-64) 
Thus Rahner claims that from the very movement of the 
human intellect we are able to establish the existence of God. 
Granting this, it is not difficult to see why Rahner rejects 
any metaphysics which claims that negation must be grounded 
in a transcendence towards nothingness. Because of the 
VorgrifJ of absolute being, the subject is able to perceive finite 
beings as limited. Negation is thus derived from the compre-
hension of a " less" or " limit" in terms of a " more" or " full," 
'rhe concept of non-being is thus also derived from the V orgriff 
of esse absolutum. 
Non-being does not precede negation, but the pre-concept relative 
to the unlimited is in itself already the negation of the finite, to 
the extent that, as condition for the possibility of its cognition, and 
through its rising above the finite, it reveals; eo ipso, its finitude. 
The affirmation of the thing that is in itself unlimited is therefore 
the possibility for negation, and not the other way around. Thus 
we are not required to assume a transcendence relation to non-
being, which, preceding all negation and providing its foundation, 
would have to disclose the finitude of an existent thing for the first 
time. Positive unlimitation of the transcendental horizon of human 
knowledge automatically displays the finitude of all that does not 
fill up this horizon. (HW, 62) 
These analyses lead Rahner to the conclusion that man by 
nature is a spirit who is able to affinn the existence of God, and 
furthennore, because of the analogy of being, he has the 
potentiality for a more extensive knowledge of God. "Man is 
the absolute receptivity for being pure and simple." It is not 
possible to pursue Rahner's existential analysis further. In the 
discussion which follows, he argues that although being is 
luminous, man's' grasp of it is necessarily limited because of his 
own finitude. He argues, furthermore, that God as absolute 
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being must be conceived as a free spirit ,vho could reveal more 
about himself to man if it was his divine ,viII to do so. Because 
of the very nature of man's receptivity as a composite of body 
and spirit, the place of such a free revelation would have to be 
human history and the mode ,yould have to be the sensible 
word (understood in its broadest meaning as either word or 
act). Man, therefore, has a potentiality for" hearing" such 
an historical word if God speaks. Furthermore, the philosophy 
of religion can show man his need to look for such a word in 
history. 
Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to summarize. 
Rahner maintains that Heidegger is essentially a metaphysician 
concerned with establishing a new, more fundamental ontology 
through a transcendental analysis of man as the one who 
necessarily poses the question about being. As far as Rahner 
can tell, however, Heidegger's analysis seems to lead to 
the conclusion that man transcends towards nothingness. In 
Hearers of the Word Rahner is also concerned with carrying 
out an existential analytic of man as the one who necessarily 
poses the question about being. Like IIeidegger he appears to 
maintain that man is able to raise the question about being 
because man already has a comprehension of being as such. 
Like Heidegger he appears to maintain that the being of which 
man has a pre-comprehension is distinct from all other beings. 
But unlike Heidegger (as Rahner understands him) , he main-
tains that the ultimate sense of being is not nothingness but 
rather God, grasped in the movement of all human affirmation, 
whether in act or deed, towards pure and absolute "having-
being." As such, God constitutes not only the object of human 
activity, but also more significantly, the condition of its 
possibility. As a composite of body and spirit man possesses 
the potentiality to receive a further revelation from God if one 
is given. Man is thus a potential "hearer" of a divine word. 
* * * 
Rahner's evaluation of Heidegger's ontology in the article 
discussed and his implicit refutation of Heidegger's alleged 
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"nihilism" in Hearers of the Word presupposes that Heidegger, 
like Rahner, is asking about "being as such, under its most 
general and total aspect.~' It presupposes that "by most 
general is meant, ultimately the simple fact of being, esse, 
characteristic of every ens," and that" by most total is meant 
esse again as the unifying aspect under which every possible 
object can be grasped, summed up, and related to its ultimate 
and unique explanation." (CF, 128) Rahner, therefore, is 
asking about" beings as beings " or " being as being" (ens qua 
ens) , just as Aristotle and St. Thomas. The difference is that 
he founds his metaphysics on a transcendental analysis. What 
is more significant to our discussion is that he presupposes 
that Heidegger's problematic is, and must be, the Salne. As 
Heidegger's thought has developed, however, it has become 
increasingly clear that his understanding has emerged out of 
what he believes is a very different question. 
In the" Introduction" to WM (written in 1949) , Heidegger 
notes that the science which traditionally has been called 
metaphysics has al\vays asked about being as beings, or about 
being (the totality or beings) as being. The asking of this 
question, as Rahner noted, has led according to Heidegger's 
analysis to two distinct pursuits. The one seeks to under-
stand, that is to say, to represent, that which is common to 
all beings-, their beingness, or in Thomistic terminology esse. 
l"his study is called "ontology." The other seeks to under-
stand the beingness of being in terms of their cause or sufficient 
reason-which for Rahner is esse absolutum (God) -and it is 
called" theology." 10 Both questions ask about beings, or in 
terms which Heidegger would insist are misleading, about finite 
being. Heidegger argues that he is asking a very different 
question. He is not asking about being but about Being itself 
as distinct from beings. Thus it will be maintained here that 
Heidegger's question about Being (it will be helpful to use a 
capital" B " to designate Heidegger's "Sein") is different from 
Rahner's question about being. 
10 Here "theology" refers to a branch of metaphysics, not to the Church's 
explication of Revelation. 
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In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger attempts to 
introduce the question of Being as he understands it. He main-
tains there that because metaphysics, in the ordinary sense of 
the term, is concerned only with questioning beings as beings 
(ta physika), it can be called a "physics." If philosophic 
thought is to have a solid foundation, however, it is necessary 
to go beyond questions about being to the question about Being 
itself (meta ta physica). As he saw it in 1935, "even in the 
doctrines of being as pure act (Thomas Aquinas) , as absolute 
concept (Hegel), as eternal recurrence of the identical will 
to power (Nietzsche), metaphysics has remained unalterably 
'physics.'" (EM, 14) Heidegger believes that the question of 
Being which he asks is not at all the same as the question 
which metaphysicians through the ages have asked. 
Although this position is more obvious in these later works, 
it has been the direction of his thought from the very beginning. 
As his problematic has developed it has become clear that it is 
not a question of Heidegger giving up metaphysics or gradually 
disengaging himself from the metaphysical understanding of 
being. Rather, it is a question of a difference, there from the 
beginning, between his problematic and that of the tradition, 
gradually becoming more explicit.ll It is at the level of the 
very question asked where the difference begins to emerge 
between Rahner's question about esse and Heidegger's question 
about Being itself. 
It is just this difference, however, which is overlooked if the 
existential analytic of Dasein proposed in SZ is interpreted, 
as Rahner interprets it, as an attempt like those of Kant, 
Descartes, or any modern metaphysician to put metaphysics 
on a new foundation. It is true, of course, that in the intro-
duction to SZ Heidegger describes his task as the establishing 
of a " fundamental ontology" through the" existential analytic 
of Dasein." (SZ, 13) 12 He also suggests, however, that" funda-
11 The analysis here does not wish to deny that there has been a "tum" in 
Heidegger's thought; but the fact that there has been a "tum" does not mean 
that his problem has essentially changed. The fundamental question remains the 
same even though the questions asked have changed. 
12 Italics here and in all following quotes are Heidegger's unless otherwise stated. 
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mental ontology" is fundamental not because, as Rahner 
suggests, it bases the knowledge of being on a new foundation 
or because it asks the question about beings in a new way 
but because it asks a question which is more original than any 
such question about beings. The aim of SZ is not to lay the 
basis for an answer to the question about being, nor to ask the 
same question in a new way, but rather " ... to work out the 
question of Being ... " itself. (SZ, 1) Thus, when he says 
further that "our provisional aim is the interpretation of 
time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever 
of Being," (SZ, 1) this should be understood to suggest not only 
that "time" will help to answer the question of Being but 
primarily and more significantly that time will indicate the 
very sense of the question itself. It is easy to aSSUlue that 
Heidegger is only polemicizing against Neo-Kantains when he 
says that it is necessary "to raise anew the question of the 
meaning of Being." (SZ, 1) It becomes clear as he progresses, 
however, that he is speaking to the whole metaphysical 
tradition. 
What are the indications of this thesis in SZ-the principal 
work that Rahner considered in his essay? In the first place, 
Heidegger speaks of the need for a " destruction of ontology " 
and the" history of ontology." (SZ, 19-27) He explains that 
the need for destruction "is essentially bound up with the way 
the question of Being is formulated .... " (SZ, 23) Is it to be 
supposed that Heidegger intends a complete denial of the 
philosophic past? No, for he insists that the aim of the de-
struction is positive, as well as negative, and that it can achieve 
this aim only if it starts within the history of thought. But 
how begin from a destruction? What is the aim of the destruc-
tion? He seems to hint-and seen from the perspective of 
Heidegger's later works it is a hint difficult to miss-that 
fundamental ontology will begin from a rediscovery of an 
original beginning though a destruction of what has followed 
from it. 
. . . taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy 
the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at 
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those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways 
of determining the nature of Being-the ways which have guided 
us ever since. (SZ, 22) 
In the pages which follow Heidegger states that this forgotten-
ness of Being applies alike to the Greeks, the Scholastics, 
Decartes, Kant, and Hegel. Now Rahner had maintained that 
Heidegger wanted to go beyond the traditional starting point 
of Metaphysics because he sought a foundation for ontology 
which did not conceive " being" beforehand in terms of logic. 
This is true, but only half true. Heidegger is seeking not merely 
a new foundation but is seeking a new foundation in the asking 
of a new question. It is because a new question is asked that 
his ontology is more fundamental. 
But how precisely is the question of Being as Heidegger 
understands it different from the metaphysician's notion of 
being? What is the meaning of the word "Being" in the 
phrase" the question of Being"? The problem which the meta-
physician confronts with SZ, as Rahner noted, is that Heideg-
ger never gets to the task of defining the sense of Being-at 
least from a metaphysical point of view. What then can be 
discerned about the question of Being from the SZ analysis? 
For one thing, it has already been noted that to ask for a 
metaphysical definition, or even the grounds for one, from SZ 
is apparently contrary to Heidegger's intention. It seems that 
what ought to be sought is Heidegger's understanding of how 
the question should be asked. How? He maintains that the 
clue to how will be discovered, as Rahner observed, by examin-
ing Dasein, the place where the question is asked, and seeing 
in this examination that" time" is the ultimate transcendental 
horizon for the question of Being. The existential analytic of 
Dasein could, then, be called "transcendental" but not in the 
sense that Rahner gives to the term. In seeking an understand-
ing of Dasein's comprehension of Being Heidegger is proposing 
to lay the basis for a question which he maintains that Kant 
never posed. Heidegger wants it to be understood that the 
question which guides him has been ignored and forgotten in 
metaphysics and ontology. The term of that question-Being 
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-should not be understood in terms of the history of philo-
sophy and so not as a "transcendental philosophy" in the 
traditional sense. Rahner's contention that Heidegger is essen-
tially a transcendental philosopher is thus very misleading if 
not altogether incorrect. 
What, then, does Heidegger reveal about the term of his 
inquiry in SZ? First, he tells us that Being is "that which 
determines beings as beings, that on the basis of which beings 
are already understood .... " (SZ, 6) Although-or perhaps 
because-Being is that which determines beings and is COlnmon 
to them all, Heidegger insists that Being is not a being or in 
any way like beings. 
The Being of beings" is" not itself a being. If ,ve are to under-
sand the problem of Being, our first philosophic step consists in not 
p.,v(}6v Tt,va o t,'Y)Y f. [a (}t,a , in not" telling a story"-that is to say, in not 
defining beings as beings by tracing them back in their origin to 
some other beings, as if Being had the character of some possible 
being. (SZ, 6) 
Heidegger makes the same point when he says: 
Being as the basic theme of philosophy is no class or genus of 
heings, yet it pertains to every being. Its" universality" is to be 
sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond 
every being and every possiblp, character which a being may 
possess. Being is the transcenden~ pure and simple. (SZ, 38) 
This transcending, however, is not an abstraction, nor does 
Heidegger propose to seek it through abstraction. Rather, he 
intends to " work out the question of the meaning of Being and 
to do so concretely." (SZ, 1) 
A further indication of what Heidegger intends to interrogate 
in the question about Being can be found in his analysis of 
the word " phenolnenology." The term originates from two 
Greek words: ~avv6~EvOV and A6yo~. Heidegger maintains that 
cPavv6~EvOV signifies that which shows itself in itself or manifests 
itself as itself. "Accordingly the ~aLv6~Eva or 'phenomena' 
are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought 
to light-what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with 
'Ta. OV'Ta (beings)." (SZ, 28) For Heidegger, however, this 
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"showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which 
something can be encountered." (SZ, 31) Heidegger maintains 
that the real meaning of the second term, A.6'Yo~, has been 
covered up by later interpretations of it as reason, judgment, 
concept, definition, ground or relationship. He argues that 
the word originally meant to make manifest what one is talking 
about. It is a "letting something be seen." Phenomehology 
thus means to let be manifest or un-hidden that which mani-
fests itself. '¥hat then does phenomenology let be seen? 
Heidegger argues that: 
Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part 
does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in 
contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does sho\v 
itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to it so 
essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. (SZ, 35) 
What can this something be? Heidegger argues that it is 
Being. 
Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which 
relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only 
"in disguise," is not just this or that, but rather the Being of 
beings, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can 
be cov~red up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no 
questions arise about it or about its meaning. (SZ, 60) 
This analysis of the meaning of "phenomenology" is not 
meant merely as a digression into the nature of Heidegger's 
methodology. Rather it intends to reveal a basic character-
istic of Heidegger's understanding of Being which gets de-
veloped already in his conception of phenomenology as the only 
adequate way to do fundamental ontology. That which shows 
itself is the Being of beings. Being as a " showing-itself is not 
just any showing itself." It is not just something like appearing. 
Being is the foundation of any kind of appearing at all. It 
underlies all beings. Behind this showing-itself (Being), there 
is nothing else. Yet it is the character of this showing-itself, 
that it can be hidden and forgotten while one gazes on the 
beings it lets be manifest. (SZ, 36-37) 
Heidegger is thus seeking the meaning of the Being of beings. 
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Although Being appears to be correlative with the beings which 
it manifests., it is also distinct from them. It is not in any 
sense a being, or like beings. For this reason one cannot speak 
about Being in any way like one would speak about beings. 
Nor can Being be thought of as proceeding from a being. It is 
a "pure transcending" which is beyond beings. But note, 
Heidegger does not say Being is a transcendent (noun), for 
example, a transcendent Being. He rejects as missing the 
issue any question which like the one posed by Rahner seeks to 
trace beings to a cause (i. e., God). This is why Heidegger 
insists that his thought does not speak either for or against the 
existence of God. From the perspective of his question the 
problem of God does not arise. Since Rahner, however does 
not note the difference between his question (the metaphysical 
question) and Heidegger's, he is not able to see how Heidegger 
can claim that the analysis has not prejudged the God issue. 
Heidegger, however, is not seeking to detennine the source of 
beings, but the meaning of Being itself. Being is that manifest-
ing by which beings are " present" to Dasein. Although Being 
manifests itself in its manifesting of beings, in the coming-to-
presence of beings, it remains itself concealed. It remains itself 
a manifesting, not a manifested. Being needs therefore, to be 
brought from concealment to non-concealment. The analysis 
of Dasein as the place where Being is revealed, and also forgot-
ten, shows that this comprehension takes place through the 
temporal structure of Dasein and thus suggests that "time" 
is the clue or horizon through which the meaning of Being can 
be questioned. SZ has not thought Being, however, merely by 
giving this clue or discovering this horizon. Heidegger con-
cludes his analysis insisting that " the dispute in regard to the 
interpretation of Being cannot be straightened out, because it 
has not even been begun." (SZ, 437) 
It can be surmised from this that Heidegger would argue that 
the trouble with Rahner's evaluation of SZ is that it has not 
even recognized the question. It completely misses the point. 
Rahner's principle criticism of Heidegger, however, is not 
based on the analyses of SZ so much as on the arguments of 
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WM. According to Rahner the conclusion of these arguments 
seems to be that the ultimate sense of being is " nothingness." 
This criticism again misses the real issue. It is true that in WM 
Heidegger proposes to understand Being in terms of the 
problem of "Nothing" (Nichto). Heidegger's use of this tenn, 
however, is carefully nuanced and should not be equated with 
some sort of metaphysical "nothingness." 
WM was originally written as a lecture for an audience com-
posed mostly of scientists. It proposed to introduce a question 
which the sciences as such do not consider, namely, the 
metaphysical question. It must be noted from the start, how-
ever, that Heidegger is defining metaphysics as he conceives it, 
not as it has been conceived historically. 
Heidegger maintains that the sciences consider that which-is 
and nothing more. He claims that the "and nothing more" 
is intrinsic to the sciences' conception of their subject matter. 
But how conceive this Nothing ,vithout representing it as some 
thing? The question, "What is Nothing?" seems to demand 
the illogical reply that, "Nothing is this or that thing," when 
it is known perfectly ,veIl that Nothing is not any thing. To 
avoid this" logical" problem Heidegger suggest an examination 
of the off-the-cuff definition of Nothing as the negation of the 
totality-of-what-is. This could perhaps be reasonably maintain-
ed if the totality-of-what-is could be known or conceived in 
itself, but it cannot. Thus another impass has been reached. It 
is not an inescapable impasse Even though the whole of what-
is in its totality is not accessible in itself, "it is equally 
certain that we find ourselves placed in the midst of what-is and 
that this is somehow revealed in totality." (WM,333) Ho\v 
is it revealed? Recalling the analysis of SZ, Heidegger main-
tains that the totality is grasped on the level of " disposition," 
and that this grasp is revealed in moods such as boredom or 
the joy felt in the presence of a loved one. This dispositional 
awareness constitutes an essential mode of Dasein's being-in-
the-world. As Rahner noted, it is not just a matter of feeling 
but the ground for the possibility of any knowledge of beings. 
Unfortunately this awareness of the totality-of-what-is still does 
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not tell anything about Nothing, for it is a revelation of and 
absorption in the totality-oI-what-is. It appears to exclude any 
revelation of the opposite, that which absolutely is not, namely, 
Nothing. Heidegger maintains, however, that there are moods, 
although perhaps rare, which reveal Nothing itself. Such is 
the mood of profound dread (Angst). Heidegger's description 
of this mood is classic. 
In dread, as we say, " one feels something uncanny." 'Vhat is this 
" something" (es) and this "one"? Weare unable to say 
what gives " one" the; uncanny feeling. One just feels it generally 
(im Ganzen). All things and we \vith them, sink into a sort of 
indifference. But not in the sense that everything simply dis-
appears; rather, in the very act of dra ,ving a ,vay from us every-
thing turns towards us. This withdrawal of what-is-in-totality, 
which the)! crowds round us in dread, this is 'v hat oppresses us. 
There is nothing to hold on to. The only thing that remains and 
overwhelms us whilst what-is slips away, is this" nothing." 
Dread reveals Nothing . 
. . . Dread hold us in suspense because it makes what-is-in-
totality slip away froln us. (WM, 336) 
The experience of dread witnesses, then, what Heidegger de-
scribes most evocatively as the failure of all '" Is '-saying 
(' 1st' -Sagen)." (vVM, 336) 
Heidegger concludes from this analysis that negation does 
not precede or ground the grasp of Nothing9 but on the con-
trary, the grasp or Nothing precedes and grounds negation. 
Nothing is revealed but not as any thing, and not as the 
negation of any or even all things. This grasp of Nothing is 
not just an interesting but irrelevant fact. Science, our knowl-
edge of what-is, knows what-is only in distinction from what-is-
not (i. e., Non-being or No-thing). Similarly, SZ and KM 
argued that knowledge of beings (what-is) is possible only be-
cause Dasein can pass beyond that which-is. \Vhat is the tenn 
of this passing beyond? It is not any thing, not what-is-in-
totality, but rather Nothing-that is to say, no thing. Nothing 
turns out to be one with Being as such. It is to Being as not 
any thing that Dasein transcends, and it is Being a.s Nothing 
which makes the revelation of what-is possible. 
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Nothing is neither an object nor anything that" is" at all. Nothing 
occurs neith~ by itself nor "apart from" what-is, as a sort of 
adjunct. Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-i& 
as such possible for our human existence. (WM, 340) 
Here is the essential difference between Rahner's notion of 
Being and Heidegger's. RahLer maintains that the subject can 
know beings only because it sees them within the horizon of 
a "more." This seeing within the horizon of a more is possible 
because the subject already grasps (though non-thematically) 
absolute being in the direction of all human thought and 
activity. He claims, therefore, that negation and the concept 
of non-being are derived from this grasp of the limited as 
limited (i. e., partially negated) in terms of absolute being. 
What is most important is that he claims that these observa-
tions constitute the basis for a proof of God's existence. 
Heidegger, on the other hand, does not maintain as Rahner 
suggests that Dasein transcends toward nothingness. Rather, 
he argues that'Dasein transcends (the term is misleading) to 
Being as no thing. Heidegger claims that a metaphysical 
analysis such as Rahner's leaves unasked the question about 
the meaning of Being as different from beings and as that 
" different" which makes the revelation of beings possible. 
Rahner had argued that the knowledge of beings demands as 
its condition of possibility a VorgrifJ of an absolute being. 
Heidegger maintains to the contrary, not that knowledge of 
beings must be explained by nothingness but that it can be 
explained sufficiently only by the recognition that Dasein 
grasps Being as different from beings. In the later works 
Heidegger comes to the realization (the famous "turn") that 
it is not just that Dasein grasps Being as different from beings 
but rather that Dasein itself is grasped-grasped in the 
" event" of the ontological difference. Still it is the ontological 
difference which opens up the world of beings and Being to 
Dasein. 
Rahner uses the term" ontological difference" in Hearers 
of the Word, and in The Thomist Spectrum Helen John claims 
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that Rahner is aware of the ontological difference.1s It appears 
from what has been seen here, however, that in a metaphysical 
context that term must have a very different meaning than 
Heidegger gives it. Heidegger would argue that to think the 
meaning of this difference in terms of being-even in terms of 
a supreme absolute having-being-is an extrapolation which 
has avoided the real question that needs asking. Such thinking 
represents Being as a being instead of probing the meaning of 
Being as such. It assumes an answer to the question which 
Heidegger wants to pose. WM, therefore, does not propose 
that man transcends toward nothingness. Rather it suggests 
that before we ask about the possibility of Dasein transcending 
to something, we ought first to ask what is Being as such, as 
different from beings. The reflection on Non-being or Nothing 
was intended, like the analysis of Dasein in SZ, to serve as an 
introduction to the question about Being as Heidegger under-
stands it. How, then, phrase the ground question of meta-
phsics? Heidegger suggests the formula: "Why is there any 
being at all-why not far rather nothing?" (WM, 345) 
The implications of this formula are developed in An 
Introduction to Metaphysics. It should be clear by now that 
for Heidegger the phrase" rather than nothing" is not a mere 
explication of the question, " Why are there beings?" Rather, 
it indicates that the question asked is not a question about 
beings. It is a question about Being as such, for it "remains 
unclear what is to be thought under the name' Being.'" (EM, 
26) Heidegger claims that "here we are asking about some-
thing which we barely grasp, which is scarcely more than the 
sound of a word for us .... " (EM, 27) Intrinsic, then, to the 
question "Why are there beings rather than nothing? " is the 
question "How does it stand with Being?" It is "indis-
pensable that we make it clear from the very outset how it 
stands at present with Being and with our understanding of 
Being." (EM, 27) In asking this question Heidegger does not 
propose to define Being, for, as he insisted even in SZ, Being 
18 Helen James John, The Thomist Spectrum (New York, 1966), p. 168. 
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is not a thing and therefore cannot be defined. Rather, he 
claims that the question ,,; How does it stand with Being?" 
seeks to rediscover for its own what the word "Being" says. 
It does not seek meaning in a statement but in a question and 
in a questioning attitude, through which Heidegger hopes to 
recapture or retrieve the begil~ning of our "historical-spiritual 
existence." (EM, 32) Heidegger insists again that "funda-
mental ontology" in SZ did not designate a branch of philo~ 
sophy which deals only with a doctrine about beings (i. e., 
their cause and nature) but rather signified "the endeavor to 
make Being manifest itself, and to do so by the question ' how 
does it stand with Being?' (and not with beings as such)." 
(EM, 34) Heidegger maintains that the very asking of this 
question is the only way to experience the sense of Being. In 
asking it Being is manifested even though in a way which is 
at once both totally indeterminate and highly determinate. 
(cf. EM, 60) The question of Being, therefore, does not seek 
something which we know, or can know-except by question-
Ing. 
The true problem is \vhat we do not know and what, insofar as 
we kno,v it authentically, namely as a problem, ,ve know only 
questioningly. 
To know ho,v to qu~stion means to know how to wait, even a 
,vhole lifetime. But an age \vhich regards only ,vhat goes fast and 
can be clutched with both hands looks on questioning as " remote 
from reality" and as something that does not pay, ,vhose benefits 
cannot be numbert;d. But the essential is not number. . . . 
(EM, 172) 
This last statement perhaps raises more questions than it 
ans\vers. How does one know Being questioningly? How does 
one think Being as such, that is to say, as different from beings? 
It is just this question that focuses Heidegger's reflection in 
his later work, and it is in reference to this question that the 
sense of " hearing" or " attending" is developed. A thorough 
and adequate examination of this problem would demand more 
attention than it is possible to give it here, but some idea of 
what sense "hearing" can have in regard to Heidegger's 
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question of Being can be indicated by pursuing the analysis 
of EM a little further. 
In Rahner's summary of Heidegger's thought it was observed 
that Heidegger opposes any consideration of the Being question 
in terms of logic. In our analysis of WM it was sho\vn that the 
reason Heidegger opposes the domination of the question of 
Being by logic is that logic as understood today is a science 
which deals with the consideration of beings. In the third 
section of the fourth chapter of EM Heidegger considers the 
relation of Being and thought. In that discussion it becomes 
clear that Heidegger opposes logic because there is a more 
primary sense of XoyoS' which is the ground of what \ve no\v 
understand by the term. This more primary sense of logos is 
what ought to determine our thought. In the development of 
this notion the sense of " hearing" is presented. 
Heidegger maintains that logic as the science of thought is 
today understood as the science of statements. Thinking, in 
this view therefore, is determined by the statement. Logo.fIJ 
" d " " d· "d l· " t k " means wor or lscourse an egezn means 0 spea , 
as in dialogue or monologue. Heidegger argues, however, that for 
the Greeks logos originally meant" to gather" or " to collect.!" 
Heidegger cites examples from Homer and Heraclitus to illu-
strate his point and claims that the sense of these passages 
can be understood only if we understand logos as originally 
denoting the collecting collectedness of Being as that which 
manifests beings. 
Logos characterizes Being in a ne\v and yet old respect: that 
which is, which stands straight and distinct in itself, is at the 
same time gathered togetherness in itself and by its~lf, and 
maintains itself in such togetherness. (EM, 110) 
Logos is thus, according to Heidegger, originally understood as 
Being itself insofar as it is the gathering together of all that 
is. "Logos here signifies neither meaning nor word nor doctrine, 
and surely not' meaning of a doctrine '; it means: the original 
collecting collectedness which is in itself perlnanently domi-
nant." (EM, 108) 
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Heidegger notes that there is one text, however, which seems 
to contradict his theory. In Fragment 50 a connection is made 
between logos and" hearing" which seems to suggest that logos 
is something "audible" (i. e., a word or speech): "If you 
have heard not me but tb~ logos, then it is wise to say 
accordingly: all is one." (EM, 108) Heidegger argues that 
Heraclitus is not referring here to a hearing of H words" but to 
a hearing or attending to that which makes words possible, 
namely, an attending to Being itself. Only in this way can 
it be explained why men are described by Heraclitus as 
uncomprehending when they confront the logos. Heidegger 
maintains that properly understood Fragment .50 says "do 
not attach importance to words but heed the logos." For 
Heideggerj then, "Tnle hearing has nothing to do \vith ear 
and mouth, but means to follow the logos and what it is, 
namely, the collectedness of beings itself." (EM, 109) 
Thus by "hearing" Heidegger once again refers us to the 
Being question. There can be true speaking and hearing only 
in an attending to Being itself. As Heidegger sees it, this 
attending is in fact the origin of the definition of man in terms 
of logos. The definition is not accomplished by " seizing upon 
any attributes in the living creature called 'man' as opposed 
to other living creatures." Rather" being-human is logos, the 
gathering and apprehending of the Being of beings: it is the 
happening of that strangest of all, in whom through violence, 
through acts of power . . ., the overpowering is made manifest 
and made to stand." (EM, 143) " Hearing" for Heidegger, 
therefore, defines the essence of man as "existence," as the 
place where Being is manifested and is thus quite different 
from Rahner's notion of man as a " hearer." 
* * * 
It is unfortunate that Heidegger's notion of the type of 
thought proper to Being cannot be pursued further.14 This 
14 See William J. Richardson's H eidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought 
(The Hague, 1968), to which the thesis presented here is much indebted. 
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essay, however, was meant only as a preliminary delimitation 
of the essential difference between Rahner's thought and 
Heidegger's, and this aim has been reached. It is at the very 
level of the question asked that their philosophies confront 
each other. It seems necessary to stress that this difference is 
prior to, although not separate from, the question of methodo-
logy. I say this because Thomists who attempt to evaluate 
Heidegger's philosophy often seem to suggest that the real 
difference between their metaphysics and Heidegger's pheno-
menology is that the latter, because of the limitations of his 
method, cannot pursue the question of being as far as the 
metaphysician can. This interpretation seems to imply that 
the limitations of this methodology are due primarily to 
epistemological presuppositions. Rahner, for example, does 
not seem to feel that there is any reason why, if he wanted, 
Heidegger could not advance his thought beyond fundamental 
ontology to the question of God-which, of course, is what 
Rahner does as a follower of Aquinas. But this interpretation 
presupposes that, although Heidegger's method is different, his 
question is the same. 
It has been shown here, however, that the question is not 
the same----or at least Heidegger does not believe it is the same. 
The question of Being as Heidegger experiences it is a question 
about Being as such. It is a question about that" manifesting" 
by which beings are manifest. It is not a question of represent-
ing the "beingness" of beings either in terms of what is 
common to them or in terms of the being (absolute or other-
wise) that is their cause. In fact, the question of Being is not 
a question of representing any thing. It is a question about 
that which is not a being, which cannot be thought (repre-
sented) as a being, but which nevertheless is manifested as the 
manifesting of beings. It is a question, which as far as we have 
followed it here, finds its resolution in the questioning itseif-
man attending to Being. If this is true, Heidegger's notion of 
Being is not so much determined by his method, as his method 
is determined by the question itself. Heidegger does not make 
the metaphysical move beyond Being to God, because he 
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believes that such a move originates from a radical misunder-
standing of Being. 
Does this mean that, if one accepts Heidegger's analysis, one 
must forsake the problem of God and consequently the philo-
sophy of religion? Although it seems clear that one would have 
to forsake the metaphysical "Gcd" and the philosophy of 
religion as Rahner understands it, it is not at all clear to me 
that one would have to forsake either God or theology, 
although both would have to be thought through at a much 
more fundamental level. 
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